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DIALECTICAL SWORDPLAY IN PLATO’S LACHES 
D B Futter (University of the Witwatersrand) 
Scholarly attempts to understand Plato’s distinction between 
philosophy and sophistry typically concentrate on explicit thematic 
discussions or on dialogues in which primary characters are well 
known sophists or rhetoricians. By contrast, this paper elucidates  
the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation  
of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about 
courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the  
two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by 
means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these 
defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of 
discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one 
really thinks about virtue. Socrates’ elenchus is then interpreted as an 
attempt to penetrate Nicias’s dialectical defences in order to 
reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which 
philosophy must take root. 
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1.  Introduction 
In Laches, Socrates engages in dialectical swordplay (μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις,  
178a1) with two Athenian generals. In the course of this exhibition, one general, 
Laches, repeatedly accuses the other general, Nicias, of talking like a sophist.1 
Laches complains that he can’t understand what Nicias means (194d7, 196a4-5); 
he charges him with babbling (195a6), speaking outlandishly (195e3), adorning 
himself with fine words (197c2-3) and twisting himself one way and then another 
in order to avoid refutation (196b2-7); Nicias behaves, Laches says, in a way more 
fitting to a defendant in a court of law than a participant in private discussion 
(196b6-7). 
Socrates does not immediately embrace Laches’s complaints against Nicias; 
but he takes them seriously enough to recommend a test. They should see, he says, 
whether ‘Nicias believes that he has something to say and is not arguing just  
for the sake of arguing’ (196c1-2; my trans.). This inquiry apparently leads him  
to support Laches’s complaint, for he later associates Nicias with Damon and 
Prodicus, ‘the sophist most skilled at drawing fine distinctions between words’ 
                                                   
1  Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of Laches is by R Kent Sprague, as printed in 
Cooper & Hutchinson (ed.) 1997. Revisions are indicated where appropriate. 
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(197d1-d5; cf. 200a2). Nicias appears to have been convicted of dodging like a 
man on trial, just as Laches had charged (196b1-5). 
By his representation of Laches’s complaints against Nicias, Plato gives a 
picture of somebody’s recognising or seeming to recognise discourse as sophistic. 
In his dramatization of Socrates’s attempt to determine whether there might be 
truth in this perception, he elucidates the sophistical self-defence mechanisms by 
which Nicias tries to secure his account. And, in his portrayal of Socrates’s 
refutation of Nicias, he shows how a sophistical interlocutor might be brought to 
set his weapons down so as to attain a degree of self-understanding. 
2.  Laches accuses Nicias of sophistry 
Laches accuses Nicias of sophistic speech on multiple occasions in the dialogue.2  
I will in this section trace out the evidence for this claim as manifest in each of four 
discernible stages of discussion. 
The first stage of discussion is initiated by Socrates’s request that Nicas tell 
what he thinks that courage is (194c5-6; cf. 200b7). Nicias answers that a person is 
good in that ‘wherein he is wise’ and ‘bad in that which he is ignorant’ (194d1-2), 
so that ‘if the courageous man is really good, he must be wise’ (194d4-5; Lamb 
trans. with revisions). Laches claims not to understand: Nicias ‘speaks strangely’ 
(195a2) and ‘babbles’ (195a6), for wisdom is clearly ‘separate from courage’ 
(195a4). When Nicias replies that Laches merely wants to show him up as saying 
nothing, just as he had been shown up a few moments before (195a8-b1), Laches 
re-joins: ‘Very well, O Nicias, I will try to show this’, ‘for you are saying nothing’ 
(195b2; emphasis added; trans. with revisions).  
In the second stage, Laches questions Nicias with a view to getting him to 
specify just who it is that he says has the knowledge that constitutes courage. 
Laches supposes that each craftsman knows the terrible and confidence-inspiring 
things pertaining to his art, but is no more courageous on this account (195b8-2).  
In response to these questions, Nicias distinguishes the partial knowledge of the 
artisan from the complete knowledge of the man whom he calls courageous 
(195d9). This response infuriates Laches, who complains that his fellow general  
is not willing to admit that he ‘says nothing’ but ‘twists this way and that in  
an attempt to cover up his aporia’. Nicias adorns himself with empty words 
(196b2-7), continues Laches; this might be appropriate in a court of law but not in 
‘a meeting such as [theirs]’ (196b6-7).  
In stage three Socrates interrogates Nicias. His modus operandi is to draw 
two paradoxical implications from his definition, ostensibly with a view to 
                                                   
2  For a wide-ranging discussion of sophistry in the Platonic dialogues, though not, 
significantly, Laches, see McCoy 2007.  
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determining how he will respond. Nicias accepts the paradoxical implications by 
drawing a distinction (197b1-b2) between courage and fearlessness or daring or 
boldness (197b3-4). This response provokes the irascible Laches, who again 
accuses Nicias of adorning himself with words (197c2-3); but this time he adds a 
further contention: Nicias is trying to deprive those whom everyone agrees to be 
courageous of that honour (197c3-4). When Socrates suggests that Nicias has 
‘acquired his wisdom from Damon and Prodicus, reputedly the cleverest of the 
sophists at distinguishing terms like these’ (197d2-3; Sprague trans., with 
revisions; cf. 200a2; cf. Charm. 163d), Laches concurs: ‘[it] is ... more fitting for a 
sophist to contrive such subtleties … than a man whom the city deems to be 
worthy to be its leader’ (197d6-8; Nichols trans.).  
In stage four Socrates refutes Nicias. His method is to solicit Nicias’s 
agreement to certain propositions about the future-directedness of fear and 
confidence, and a-temporality of knowledge, in order to show his account to  
be inconsistent with the supposition on which the inquiry had proceeded, viz.  
that courage is a part of, but not the whole of, virtue (199e3-12). In response, 
Laches, who is delighted to observe his fellow general’s downfall, makes yet 
another quip about Nicias’s sophistic influences: ‘But I, my dear Nicias, felt sure 
you would make the discovery after you were so scornful of me while I was 
answering Socrates. In fact, I had great hopes that with the help of Damon’s 
wisdom you would solve the whole problem!’ (199e12-200a3). 
3.  Socrates puts Nicias on trial 
Many scholars have praised Nicias for his intelligence, thoughtfulness, and the 
Socratic tenor of his convictions.3 By contrast, Laches discerns or thinks that he 
discerns more than a hint of sophistry in Nicias’s dialectic (cf. 188c3-188e5).4 
Where does Socrates stand?  
Socrates’s initial response to Nicias’s account of courage is affirming in the 
most unexpected way: ‘By Zeus’, he says, ‘you speak truly’ (194d4-5; Lamb trans. 
with revisions). And after Laches claims not to understand, Socrates helps Nicias 
to elaborate his account (194d8-9), thereafter questioning him light-heartedly in an 
attempt to get him to specify its nature more precisely (194d10-e8). Socrates’s 
discourse in the first stage of the dialogue is exegetical in character, apparently 
                                                   
3  See, for example, O’Brien 1963:42, Hoerber 1968:104 and Penner 1992:20-22.  
4  Scholars who to some extent agree with Laches’s assessment of Nicias’s character 
include Dobbs 1986:828, Schmid 1992:§4.8 and 173, and Gonzalez 1998:34-36. 
However, none of these scholars give an account of Nicias’s dialectical defence 
mechanisms or explains how Socrates penetrates them in returning Nicias to himself in 
defeat. 
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designed to elaborate the content of the ‘true’ account of courage that Nicias had 
given. 
Socrates is relatively supportive of Nicias in the second stage of the 
dialogue too. For example, when Nicias under the force of Laches’s questioning 
distinguishes the conditional knowledge of every artisan from the unconditional 
knowledge of the man whom he calls courageous (195c-d), Socrates asks Laches 
whether he understands what Nicias is saying (195d10; cf. Gorg. 511b-513c), thus 
implying that he thinks that Nicias is saying something. Furthermore, after Laches 
gives up the interrogation with the complaint that Nicias contorts himself like a 
man on trial (196b1-2), Socrates makes the following suggestion: 
But let us see if Nicias thinks he is saying something and is not just [arguing 
for the sake of arguing]. Let us find out from him more clearly what it is he 
means, and if he is really saying something, we will agree with him, but if 
not, we will instruct him (196c1-4; Sprague trans. with revisions). 
Socrates here recommends a test to see whether or not Nicias is arguing for the 
sake of arguing (196c1-2; λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει). Apparently he has not yet 
made up his mind as to whether Laches’s allegations have any substance. 
By his own account, then, Socrates puts Nicias on trial in stage three of the 
dialogue; he attempts to determine whether he says something or is merely arguing 
for the sake of arguing. To this end, as already noted, Socrates draws two 
paradoxical implications from his account (196e1-9). In the first place, he argues 
that Nicias must either deny that any animal is courageous or accept that some 
animals have knowledge that very few human beings are capable of acquiring 
(196e3-196e9). In the second place, he argues that ‘he who posits courage to be 
what Nicias posits’ (196e8-9; Nichols trans. with revisions) must say that all 
animals are by nature equal in courage, even though lions and bulls, which stand 
and fight, are ordinarily considered to be more courageous than deer and monkeys, 
which run away at the first sign of danger.5 When Nicias responds by dis-
tinguishing courage from fearlessness (or boldness or daring), Socrates makes no 
comment on the cogency of Nicias’s response. Instead he quips that Laches has not 
noticed that Nicias has borrowed his wisdom from the sophists Damon and 
Prodicus (197d2-3; cf. 200a2).6 Thus it appears that Socrates has decided that 
Nicias has been answering sophistically; he has been found guilty by association. 
                                                   
5  See Schmid 1992:147. It makes sense to speak of Achilles as a lion ‘since both are 
brave’ (Aristotle, Rhet., 1406b). We notice that Laches greatly approves of Socrates’s 
reasoning, exhorting Nicias to give an ‘honest answer’ to his questions (197a1-5). 
6  According to Nicias, Socrates recommended Damon as a music teacher for his son 
(180d); it becomes clear later that Socrates refused to take Niceratus on as a pupil and 
‘always recommends other people’ (200d; cf. Theaetetus 151b5-6). On the figure of 
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In the fourth stage of the dialogue, Socrates reduces Nicias to propositional 
inconsistency. His trial of Nicias has apparently led him to conclude that the latter 
no longer deserves support for speaking truly (194d4-5) but stands in need of 
correction. It looks very much as though Nicias, having been put on trial and 
convicted, is in the end ‘instructed’ (196c4). 
4.  Nicias puts on his armour 
I have shown that Laches accuses Nicias of sophistry throughout the course of the 
dialogue. Moreover, I have argued that while Socrates is initially open-minded and 
even supportive of Nicias’s dialectic, he ultimately comes to agree with Laches. 
Nicias hides his true opinions and dodges like a defendant in a law suit (196b6-7).  
Laches’s basic complaint is that Nicias does not answer honestly (197a1-5) 
but with a view to avoiding refutation (196b1-2). The phrase ‘answer honestly’ (ὡς 
ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, 197a2) is here a placeholder, incorporating at least three 
more specific accusations. First, Nicias does not say anything or say anything 
clearly (194d7, 196a4-5, and 195a6). Secondly, he does not say what he truly 
thinks but evades and hides his state of mind (197c2-3, 197d6, 196b2-7, and 
196b6-7). And, thirdly, Nicias is willing to contradict things that everyone believes 
(197a3-5; 197c3-4). I will now work through the content of each of these charges 
with a view to clarifying the particular nature of Nicias’s defensiveness, as Laches 
— and ultimately, Socrates — sees it.  
In stage one, Nicias answers Socrates’s ‘what is x?’ question by appeal to 
something he has heard Socrates say: a person is good in that ‘wherein he is wise’ 
and ‘bad in that which he is ignorant’, so ‘if the courageous man is really good he 
must be wise’ (194d1-5; Lamb trans. with revisions).7 Laches says that he does not 
understand what Nicias means (194d7); the answer is, he suggests, vague. This 
allegation is supported by the action in the sequel, since Socrates clarifies the 
statement for Laches. What Nicias means, Socrates suggests, is that courage is a 
kind of wisdom (194d8-9). 
                                                                                                                     
Damon in other Platonic writings, see Alcibiades 118c, and Republic 440a. For 
discussion, see Schmid (1992:21-24). On the Platonic representation of Prodicus, see 
e.g. Plato, Cratylus 384b, Charmides 163b-e, Meno 75e, Theaetetus 151b5-6, and, most 
importantly, Protagoras 315d-316a, 337a-c, 339e-341c, and 358a-b. For helpful 
discussion, see Schmid (ibid. 24-26). As Schmid points out, Prodicus ‘was spoken of as 
a pupil of Protagoras in the doxographic tradition ...’ (ibid. 187). 
7  As Linda Rabieh observes, Nicias seems to draw the wrong inference from his Socratic 
account: ‘A strict paraphrase of Socrates’ formulation would say that if the courageous 
man is wise, he must be good’ (2006:68). This is a delightful Platonic touch, which 
demonstrates that Nicias has failed to understand the account he attributes to Socrates. 
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Laches’s response to Socrates’s attempt to clarify Nicias’s meaning is ‘what 
sort of wisdom?’ (194d20) Thus he judges Socrates’s attempted elaboration of 
Nicias’s dark statement to be overly general — ‘wisdom, but of what sort?’ 
(194d10). Socrates agrees with this assessment, suggesting that Laches ask Nicias 
what sort of wisdom he means (194e1). He then pre-empts the inquiry by putting 
some questions of his own to Nicias. These questions are, as Laches observes, 
intended to ‘let him say what kind of knowledge it is’ (194e10).8 They are thus 
meant to get Nicias to make more specific the overly general answer that Socrates 
has attributed to him. 
In response to Socrates’s questioning (194e3-8), Nicias defines the wisdom 
constitutive of courage as ‘knowledge of the terrible and confidence-inspiring, both 
in war and in all other things’ (195a1; Nichols trans. with revisions; cf. Prot. 
360d5, Rep. 429c and 442c). While this answer is more informative than the 
previous attempt, it remains overly general. At the very least, something further 
needs to be said about ‘all [the] other things’ in which the courageous person has 
knowledge (cf. 191d-e). This reading is again confirmed by Laches’s subsequent 
questioning, which attempts to give more specific content to Nicias’s 
understanding of the nature of the knowledge of the terrible and confidence-
inspiring. The fact that Laches’s questioning is conducted with the intention of 
refuting Nicias does not make it any less exegesis. 
In the course of his cross-examination of Nicias (stage two), Laches 
expresses frustration at his interlocutor’s evasiveness in answering the question of 
who has the knowledge constitutive of courage. ‘I don’t understand what he wants 
to say’, says Laches; ‘he doesn’t show a seer or a doctor or anyone else as the one 
he calls courageous, unless perhaps he means some god’ (196a5-7). Laches thus 
communicates, once more, his sense that Nicias is being shifty (197a7-b2). The 
objection is in this instance not so much that his fellow statesman evades the issue 
by making unclear statements or giving overly general answers; rather, it is that he 
— while claiming to know — refuses to say who it is that has the knowledge 
constitutive of courage.  
As indicated by the above analysis of stages one and two, Laches thinks  
that Nicias ducks and dives by giving vague and overly general answers, and 
condescendingly refusing to state his meaning. He is surely right in thinking that 
these modes of response are dialectical defence mechanisms. Vagueness forces the 
examiner to substitute the question ‘what do you mean?’ for questions such as ‘is 
                                                   
8  There is an error at 194e10 in the Sprague translation. The line ‘Let him state what kind 
of knowledge it is’ belongs to Laches, not Socrates. 
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this true?’ or ‘is it consistent with such and such?’9 Thus the respondent who gives 
vague or unclear answers cannot be shown to be inconsistent or to be speaking 
falsely.10 And something similar is true of overly general answers, which are 
uninformative even if they are clear, and on account of this, less vulnerable to 
refutation (cf. Phaedo 100e). (The limiting case of the overly general answer is the 
tautology, which cannot be falsified because it does not say anything.) Likewise, a 
respondent’s claim to be in possession of abstruse knowledge that cannot be 
imparted to the questioner shields her from refutation by depriving the questioner 
of content for evaluation.  
In stage three’s examination of Nicias’s discursive intentions, Socrates 
focuses attention on cases where an individual or species deemed courageous does 
not have all-things-considered knowledge of the terrible and confidence-inspiring 
(196e6-9). Nicias’s defence is to radically circumscribe the domain to which 
courage has application: almost no one ordinarily thought to be courageous is 
really so (197b2-6). In this, he avoids refutation by undercutting the foundation of 
shared opinion necessary for further discussion. Since he will not admit any 
intuitive examples of courage, no counter-example can be constructed; his 
definition is un-falsifiable.11 It is noteworthy that whereas Laches complains about 
Nicias’s willingness to contradict what everyone believes (197a3-4), Socrates does 
not press the point at all. Instead he remarks that Nicias does not answer with an 
opinion that is relevantly his own. Socrates’s suggestion seems to be that he takes 
refuge in clever distinctions that he has borrowed from sophists, and which are 
disconnected from his own understanding of the phenomenon. Nicias’s parroted 
distinction between courage and fearlessness has no true significance for him; it 
merely enables him to hold on to his account. He is making use of yet another 
dialectical defence mechanism. 
With this point in mind, we recognise that Nicias’s original answer to the 
‘what is x’ question manifested a similar sort of inauthenticity. For Nicias responds 
to a request for help in dialogue (194c5-6) with a Socratic answer couched in 
reproach: Socrates has failed, he says, to introduce a claim he has made on many 
                                                   
9  Or, to put the point differently, vagueness compels exegesis. For further discussion of 
vagueness and exegesis, see Futter 2016:103-105. 
10  Of course, this strategy opens up the speaker to an accusation of speaking nonsense.  
But to judge that someone is speaking nonsense is not to refute her but to claim that she 
is no long worth conversing with. Laches reaches this point, or something close to it, 
only at 196c. 
11  While this reading might seem to be contradicted by Nicias’s ascription of the relevant 
wisdom to Laches and Lamachus, and many others (195c5-7), this is not actually so. For 
the ascription is hypothetical (εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι; 197c6), and, as Laches’s angry 
rejoinder shows, insincere and insulting (197c7-9). For a persuasive analysis of the 
exchange, see Smith 2014. 
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occasions (194d1-2). Moreover, after exegetical questioning, Nicias clarifies ‘his’ 
view with an account that resembles what Socrates says about courage in other 
dialogues (Prot. 360d, Rep. 429c and 442c). What is significant here is not that 
Nicias presents a Socratic definition, which, after all, he might have made his own; 
it is rather that he answers ‘looking’ not to what he thinks true, but to what he 
thinks that Socrates will regard as true, because he supposes that Socrates will not 
refute his own account.12 But Nicias is no seer, and, despite his professed 
familiarity with Socratic discourses (187d-188c), seems not to fully comprehend 
the nature of the man and his logoi; thus the ‘strange spectacle’ of Socrates 
overturning his own account of courage.13 
The dramatic action of the dialogue then reveals Nicias as an imitator of 
other people’s speeches. He does not answer with his own opinion, but flatters his 
questioner and parrots the distinctions of authoritative others, all with a view to 
holding onto a secure account. If further evidence for this interpretation is required, 
more can be gleaned from his response to his final refutation. For, unlike the men 
who are ‘ready to bite’ when Socrates frees them of some nonsense (Theaet. 151c), 
and like the false mother in the judgment of Solomon (1 Kings 3:16-28), Nicias 
appears unconcerned after the failure of his definition (200b). If there is any 
problem with what has been said, it is a mere technical deficiency, a problem of 
formulation, which can be resolved with the help of Damon (200b4-5).14 
The contrast with Laches’s response to his earlier dialectical failure is 
striking (194b). Laches was angry with himself for ‘being unable to [say what he 
knew] (ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν). He thought he knew what courage was (νοεῖν 
μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅτι ἔστιν), but couldn’t understand how (οὐκ 
οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ) it escaped him, so he couldn’t pin it down in words and say what it is’ 
(194a6-b4; Sprague trans. with revisions). Thus Laches had looked to himself,  
to his own assumed knowledge of courage; his anger manifests philosophical 
commitment. But Nicias does not seem to care.15 A reasonable explanation for this 
is that Nicias does not feel that his account has been refuted. This is not to say that 
he still thinks that his account is correct; it is rather that that question does not even 
arise. He is not fundamentally committed to any definition of courage but to the 
goal of saving face by preserving the account, whatever it might be.  
In summary, then, Nicias’s style of discourse appears to be a mirror image 
of that exhibited in Plato’s Euthydemus, where the ‘anti-logicians’ refute their 
                                                   
12  See also Dobbs 1986:839. 
13  See Gonzalez 1998:35-36. 
14  Cf. Schmid 1992:175. 
15  Ironically enough, Nicias later accuses Laches of looking towards others rather than 
himself (200a4-b2); this is precisely what he does in the course of his dialogue with 
Socrates. 
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interlocutor no matter what he says (see e.g. 275e5-6). His sophistry is that of the 
answerer rather than the questioner — he attempts to avoid refutation by mean of 
certain dialectical defence mechanisms, each of which manifests a distanced lack 
of concern with what he really thinks about courage. 
5.  Socrates takes up arms 
By the end of stage three, Nicias has been convicted of sophistical speech and 
argument. In stage four, Socrates penetrates Nicias’s dialectical defences. Socrates 
here exhibits the wisdom of intelligent adaptability needed to deal decisively with 
Nicias’s dialectical sophismata (183d7; cf. 182b).16 In what way does he adapt his 
discourse? This is what I shall now endeavour to explain. 
One of the most striking features of the discourse in stage four is that 
Socrates does not make much effort to determine what Nicias thinks or has in mind 
(cf. 194c5-6). He seems content to remain with what Nicias is willing to say rather 
than to search out what he might really mean.17 For example, he does not seek to 
determine whether or not Nicias thinks that courage is a part of virtue, but whether 
he answered with that view in mind (198a4); he does not try to determine what 
Nicias means by the virtues, but whether he will assent to a specific articulation of 
them (198a7-9); he does not try to determine what Nicias thinks the terrible and 
confidence inspiring things are, but whether Nicias will accept certain propositions 
that seem to him and Laches to be true (198c4); and similarly for relevant 
conceptions of knowledge and temporality (199a6-8). In each case, Socrates does 
not attempt to reconstruct what Nicias thinks of some topic; his discourse is not 
exegetical but what I shall call ‘confirmative’, that is, designed to elicit agreement 
to some specific propositions about the subject matter.18 The reader of the Greek 
text cannot help but notice the emphasis on verbal agreement; the language of 
‘supposing’ or ‘thesizing’ is also conspicuous throughout (e.g. τίθεσαι, 196e9; 
τίθησι, 197e4).  
                                                   
16  Francisco Gonzalez has shown that Laches’s anecdote of how Stesilaus’s use of a 
‘scythe spear’ (‘referred to as a sophisma (183d7)’) left him dangling in real combat 
foreshadows and parallels Nicias’s dialectical technique in the second part of the 
dialogue (1998, 23ff.). 
17  The repetition of the phase ‘your logos’ in this section of dialogue is conspicuous 
(199c5, 199d1). 
18  The basic form of the confirmative is this: ‘P; do you agree?’ There is a significant 
difference between making an effort to state one’s own understanding of something in 
responding to a ‘what is X?’ or ‘What do you say that X is?’ question (cf. Theaet. 151d-
e and Charm. 160d-e), and confirming or disconfirming a proposition about X that has 
been, as it were, presented on a plate.  
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Why does Socrates proceed this way? The obvious explanation is that he 
has come to agree with Laches: Nicias is arguing sophistically, trying to safeguard 
his definition by using methods of evasion or occlusion. Because Nicias does not 
say what he really thinks, Socrates will not be able to excavate it, but must rest 
content with what Nicias is prepared to say. At a superficial level, the shift from 
exegesis to propositional refutation is then part of Socrates’s strategy for 
counteracting and minimising the effectiveness of Nicias’s dialectical defences. 
We can understand how this might work by noticing that Nicias’s evasiveness was 
facilitated by the openness of exegetical questions, that is, questions of the form 
‘what do you think that courage is?’ (194c4-6) or ‘who do you say the courageous 
person is?’ (cf. 195a5-6). For, as has been noted, these questions enable him to 
avoid answering, to obfuscate, or to flatter and parrot the opinions of others.  
By contrast, the form of questioning I have called confirmation prevents this sort of 
evasion by straight-jacketing the answerer with specific propositions that he must 
either affirm or deny. The determinacy of the confirmative question makes it 
impossible to answer vaguely, with over-generality, or pre-packaged sayings; in 
fact, short of refusing to answer or rejecting the logic of Socrates’s argument, the 
only device that remains for his use is something akin to ‘biting the bullet’, that is, 
contradicting what everyone else believes on a topic (cf. 197a3-4).  
The substitution of the confirmative for the exegetical question not only 
counteracts Nicias’s defence mechanisms but also marks a definite change in 
Socrates’s dialectical goals. Socrates no longer tries to explain what Nicias thinks 
that courage is (stage one); nor does he merely attempt to map out what Nicias is 
willing to say (stage three), but, crucially, he also sets out to refute him by reducing 
him to propositional inconsistency. Socrates’s refutative intentions are manifest  
in what he does: he uses Nicias’s verbal agreements to derive a contradiction and 
leaves the matter there (199e). This procedure is quite different to the one he  
had adopted in his earlier discussion with Laches when he sought to uncover  
his interlocutor’s knowledge (190c4) and had interpreted incorrect or inconsistent 
answers in terms of Laches’s failure to state his knowledge of courage  
(192c5-6; 193d1-10; 194a1-b4).19 Strikingly, Socrates does not interpret Nicias’s 
inconsistency as a reason for inferring that he has not satisfactorily articulated what 
the latter has in mind (194a1-b4). Rather, he infers that they have not discovered 
what courage is (199e11-12), or at least, puts this conclusion to Nicias as a 
question.  
Socrates’s focus on propositional refutation is necessitated by Nicias’s 
sophistry. In fact, inasmuch as Nicias has distanced himself from the framework of 
shared opinion from which philosophical inquiry begins, and which must constitute 
                                                   
19  For further discussion, see Futter 2017.  
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the basis of his understanding of the topic, the only form of refutation left open to 
Socrates is reduction to propositional inconsistency. Since the sophist ‘forgets the 
truths of everyday life in his eagerness to grasp godlike wisdom’,20 he is 
invulnerable to forms of refutation that emphasise the conflict between his 
opinions and those of ordinary people (cf. the discourse of stage 3 as described 
above). Thus what remains to be done is to show that his position is contradictory. 
For the sophist will not lightly repudiate the law of non-contradiction; in fact, his 
goal of securing the speech, interpreted as maintaining a consistent position, is 
veritably defined by adherence to this principle (cf. Euthyd., passim). 
6. Nicias recognises himself in defeat 
In stage four of the dialogue, Socrates refutes Nicias. He does so in a questionable 
way, by appeal to an agreement that Nicias did not even make, and on a hypothesis 
that Socrates himself likely does not accept, viz. that courage is part of virtue 
(198a1-2; cf. 189e).21 What does Socrates hope to achieve by refuting him? 
One superficial answer to this question is that Socrates wants to show that 
Nicias has not in fact learnt the nature of courage from the sophists (186c). This is 
partly for the benefit of Laches, with whom he had formed an alliance (e.g. 
196c10-d1; 197e6-8). But it is also for the benefit of Lysimachus and Melesias, the 
two fathers whose desire to improve their sons had initiated the conversation 
(178a1-184c8). Socrates’s refutation of Nicias serves to deflate the pretension of 
the sophists to knowledge of care of the soul (186c). 
At a deeper level, though, Socrates counters Nicias’s sophistry for the sake 
of the latter’s own soul. His discourse is really a correction of Nicias, a way of 
instructing him (196c1-4). Since sophistry is a form of discursive self-alienation, 
correction of a sophistical thinker should require him to prioritise the concern for 
proper articulation of what he himself thinks over the security of the logos. 
Socrates goes some way toward accomplishing this in stage four of the dialogue, 
when he gets Nicias to recognise that he is committed to the independence of piety 
from courage.22  
This interpretation can be motivated by considering the question of why 
Nicias does not salvage his definition by rejecting the claim that virtue has parts.23 
As just noted, this is not a claim that he himself agreed to, and his account of 
courage is naturally extended to encompass virtue as whole (199c6-8; 199d1-3). 
                                                   
20  Schmid 1992:48. 
21  See Vlastos 1994:122. 
22  Cf. Dobbs 1986:844. If this seems to lead Nicias away from the truth about virtue’s 
fundamental unity, this must be because such a truth can only be recovered from within. 
23  Rabieh 2006:84. 
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Given that Nicias has been shown to have an interest in maintaining the security of 
his position, and given that he could do so without doing grave violence to the 
definition he had proposed, his failure to take this dialectical opportunity requires 
explanation. And when the details of the text are carefully scrutinised, it seems 
plausible to say that he has remembered his own commitment to piety as a virtue 
separate from courage.  
Consider the following points. When Socrates catalogues the virtues to see 
whether he and Nicias call the same things parts of virtue, he omits piety, explicitly 
mentioning justice and temperance as examples (198a8-9).24 But when he begins 
the final refutation, he introduces and even emphasises piety by placing it last in 
the sequence of enumerated virtues (199d7-8). Moreover, Socrates goes on to ask 
Nicias whether someone with the knowledge that he says constitutes courage 
would be lacking in temperance, justice or piety if he knew how to guard against 
all bad things and secure for himself all good things both in relation to men and 
gods (199d4-7). This question appears to make an impact, for ‘after the 
[suggestion] that the courageous man [would] not need piety … Nicias abandons 
his claim’.25 It may be inferred that Socrates’s success in refuting Nicias has 
something to do with this virtue.26 
Nicias’s account of courage emphasises its knowingness, the component of 
courage that distinguishes the courageous from the ignorantly fearless (197a6-b5). 
Furthermore, he understands the cognitive element of courage in terms of 
prudence, understood as the ability to secure good things for oneself and one’s city 
(197b6-c1). Socrates exploits this connection when he suggests that it is the same 
art that knows the things of the past, the present, and, crucially, how things ‘would 
and will come about most beautifully’ in the future (ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ 
γενήσεται; 198d4; cf. 197e1-2). The law commands that the general should preside 
over the seer rather than the other way around (199e3-a4) because his ‘normative’ 
knowledge of the future is superior to the ‘descriptive’ knowledge of the seer 
(196a). It is thus clear that Nicias’s conception of courage is closely related to 
prudence, and also, that Socrates’s refutation of this account homes in on the 
nature of, and prerequisites for, the exercise of this power. 
Nicias is willing to accept his dialectical comeuppance when Socrates uses 
leading questions to suggest that the man with knowledge of all good and evil 
would not be in need of virtue (199d4-5). He says: 
And do you regard that man as lacking in temperance or justice and [piety] 
to whom alone belongs the ability to deal circumspectly with both gods and 
                                                   
24  Schmid 1992:167. 
25  Rabieh 2006:84. 
26  See also Schmid 1992:10 and 168ff. 
DIALECTICAL SWORDPLAY IN PLATO’S LACHES  33 
 
men with respect to both the [terrible] and its opposite, and to provide 
himself with good things through his knowledge of how to associate with 
them correctly? (199d7-e1; Sprague trans. with revisions) 
Nicias’s response ‘you seem to me to say something’ (199e2) suggests that he has 
seen or ‘looked to’ (197e3-4) something. What has he looked to and what has he 
seen?  
We learn from the ancient sources that Nicias was an extraordinarily 
superstitious man. Plutarch informs us that he ‘made daily sacrifices, kept a diviner 
in his own home, and constantly sought out omens for guidance on matters of 
public and private affairs’.27 Laches’s earlier introduction of the diviner as the man 
whom Nicias regards as courageous was thus by no means coincidental (195e).  
It appears that Nicias has at last been led to see himself in the questioning about 
courage. His thought is momentarily turned away from Damon and logical 
consistency back onto his own actions and his existential commitment to piety as 
enabling correct association with the gods. Nicias looks to himself, and sees 
himself as one who knows by his conduct that the man of courage cannot control 
the gods. He must rather associate with them correctly by conventional rituals and 
sacrifices.28 On this reading, Nicias’s concern for the prudential aspect of courage 
leads him to accept the need for piety as a separate virtue. Thus he maintains his 
commitment to the thesis that virtue has parts and accepts that he has not found 
what courage is (199e11-12). 
Nicias lays down his dialectical weapons when he comes to recognise that 
he is committed to the goodness of piety as a virtue distinct from courage. It is this 
recognition or self-recognition that makes his logical refutation possible. Socrates 
succeeds at last in getting Nicias — at least for a moment (cf. 200b4-5) — to 
abandon his sophistic style of answering. He does not answer with a view to 
securing his safety in speech, but with what he really thinks. Socrates returns 
Nicias to what he really thinks by reminding him of his own sense of piety.29 
                                                   
27  Schmid 1992:8. The disastrous consequences of Nicias’s reliance on diviners for the so-
called Sicilian expedition are well known. See Thucydides, 7.50 and Plutarch, Life of 
Nicias, 23. 
28  Schmid’s comment on this passage is well worth quoting. He writes: ‘The words 
exeulabeisthai and prosomilein and the notion of self-provision through being in good 
standing with men and gods call vividly to mind our image of the historical Nicias, who 
appealed daily to the diviners for advice and sought in every way to remain in good 
standing with everyone, taking no risks so as to insure that he would always acquire and 
keep the good things of worldly fortune that he cherished’ (1992:167). 
29  I would like to express thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on this 
paper and to Sjarlene Thom for guiding me through the editorial process. 
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